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11. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to further our understanding of political power in a committee
environment. We consider the problem of a group of two or more agents who must split a ﬁxed
divisible good. Agents cannot use physical force to divide this good. Our goal is to clarify the
role and relative signiﬁcance of other features of the political environment such as voting rights,
proposal rights, agents’ patience, etc. in determining political power.
Following Shapley and Shubik, 1954, we gauge political power in terms of expected outcomes,
rather than a priori equate it with individual prerogatives.3 In that spirit, political power is the
share of the divisible good that agents can expect to obtain when their behavior conforms to an
appropriately deﬁned equilibrium notion.
We model committee interaction using a canonical sequential bargaining game. In each
period, a member of the committee is recognized with some probability that is ﬁxed across periods
and proposes a division of the good. Committee members then vote on the proposal. If the proposal
is approved in accordance with the underlying voting rule, the proposed division is implemented
and the game ends. Otherwise, the game moves to the next period with a new proposal and voting
round.
This model is canonical in the sense that it follows (in basic structure) standard formula-
tions in the bargaining literature as in Stahl, 1972, Romer and Rosenthal, 1978, Rubinstein, 1982,
Binmore, 1987, Baron and Ferejohn, 1989, Harrington, 1990, Banks and Duggan, 2000, etc. This
approach parsimoniously incorporates the two types of elementary actions (proposing and voting)
that are required on the part of the participants in a committee in order for this committee to
‘choose’ an agreement.
Standard intuition, replete in both colloquial conceptions about political rights as well as
in sophisticated democratic theory, suggests that political power depends on committee members’
voting rights. Perhaps the starkest manifestation of the strength of that intuition in the formal
literature are the various power indices arising from cooperative game theory (e.g. Shapley and
3For a discussion of various conceptions of political power see Riker, 1964, and a related more
recent review by Wittman, 1976.
2Shubik, 1954, Banzhaf, 1965, etc.). In these formulations voting rights determine power. But,
power indices notwithstanding, a wealth of other forces including players’ patience and proposal
rights also inﬂuence political power.4
Indeed, political thinking from diverse ﬁelds of study emphasizes the role of rules for the
origination of proposals in determining political power. Our goal is to understand how much?
Speciﬁcally, we ask whether voting rights, impatience, or the use of simple strategies place any
restriction on political power if proposal rights can be assigned without constraint among players?
We answer this question in the negative by showing that all possible power levels can be
obtained in equilibrium using proposal-making rules. For any monotonic voting rule and any
discount factors, every eﬃcient level of power can be obtained in a Stationary Subgame Perfect
(SSP) equilibrium in pure proposal strategies and stage-undominated voting strategies (Baron and
Kalai, 1993) by appropriate choice of proposal probabilities.5 T h ec o n v e r s ei sn o tt r u e ,i.e. ﬁxing
proposal probabilities, we cannot in general obtain all power levels by independently manipulating
voting rights, or discount factors, or by allowing more complex (but sequentially rational) strategies.
We emphasize that we restrict agents to use pure stationary strategies. This restriction
signiﬁcantly strengthens our result. Political power we can obtain using such simple strategies,
can also be obtained by allowing history-dependent and/or mixed strategies. In fact, the range of
political power levels that can be obtained in equilibrium expands radically if committee members
can devise complex strategies, as folk-theorem-like results regarding the set of Subgame Perfect
Nash equilibria of related bargaining games demonstrate.6
The use of stationary strategies that we require qualiﬁes the associated equilibrium and
strategies as least complex or costly, whether we measure complexity costs in terms of the number
4In inﬁnite period sequential bargaining games, such results can be traced to Rubinstein, 1982.
Eraslan, 2002, performs this analysis in the Baron & Ferejohn, 1989, model.
5A germ of this result appears in Kalandrakis, 2004, who (allowing for mixed strategies) shows
that all levels of power between big and small states represented in a bicameral legislature can be
obtained by appropriate assignment of proposal rights.
6Such theorems require patience and at least three players under unanimity (e.g. Merlo and
Wilson, 1995). Five or more players are suﬃcient with majority rule (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989).
3of automata required to describe individual strategies or equilibrium (as in Baron and Kalai, 1993),
or in terms of past information used to determine actions (as in Chatterjee and Sabourian, 2000).
The additional restriction to pure strategies further reduces complexity costs, while, for example,
Baron and Kalai, 1993, perform their analysis ignoring complexity arising from the fact that players
randomize when proposing.7
Our result strongly suggests that the emphasis on voting rights often placed by analysts,
practitioners, and constitutional engineers who aim to strike a certain balance of political power
may be signiﬁcantly misguided without attention to the rules and procedures (formal or informal)
for the origination of proposals. Examples of this bias or emphasis on voting rights include the
extensive use of various power indices in legal proceedings, or their application in various phases of
constitutional design in the European Union (EU).8
Before we move to the main analysis, we review additional related literature. Besides cooper-
ative power indices, speciﬁc relations between power and voting rules have also been derived using
non-cooperative analysis. For example, Eyal Winter, 1996, speciﬁes a sequential bargaining game
in which veto players have all power. Snyder, Ting, and Ansolabehere, 2001,9 study bargaining
using a class of voting rules represented by weighted majority voting. Under certain continuity
assumptions they derive a power index to the eﬀe c tt h a tp o l i t i c a lp o w e ri sequal to voting weights
(“except for corner solutions”).
These results rely on implicit or explicit restrictions on players’ proposal rights. In the
case of cooperative analyses, this becomes obvious by the fact that only special proposal-making
procedures implement the underlying axiomatic solutions on which some of the power indices are
7See Baron and Kalai, 1993, page 293, ﬁrst full paragraph. Baron and Kalai study symmetric
majority rule games and show that the equilibrium in Baron and Ferejohn, 1989, is the simplest.
8Dubey and Shapley, 1979, report the application of the Banzhaf or Shapley-Shubik indices in
legal or other proceedings. The list of power index applications in the EU is long. See Holler and
Widgren, 1999, Lane and Berg, 1999, and the references therein and in Garrett and Tsebelis, 1999a.
9In a later version (December, 2003) Snyder Ting and Ansolabehere also add an empirical section
where they test their prediction that power equals voting weights using government formation data
from European parliamentary systems.
4premised.10 Winter, 1996, and Nolan McCarty, 2000a,b explicitly discuss how assumptions about
proposal-making among veto and non-veto players aﬀect power levels. Similarly, the power index of
Snyder, Ting, and Ansolabehere, 2001, does not hold under all possible assumptions about players’
proposal prerogatives (e.g. Eraslan, 2002).
There also exists an extensive literature that, in consonance with our results, emphasizes the
role of proposal-making in determining political power. Particularly inﬂuential in that regard has
been the work of McKelvey, 1976, 1979, and Romer and Rosenthal, 1978. Similarly, Garrett and
Tsebelis, 1996, Tsebelis and Garrett, 1996, and Garrett and Tsebelis, 1999a,b, criticize the use of
power indices in EU studies emphasizing, among other things, the fact that they do not account
for proposal rules. Agenda setting power — its origins, assignment, and control — ﬁgure prominently
in Congressional studies on committees and proposal rules, seniority, political parties, etc.11
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. We describe the bargaining model and give
af o r m a ld e ﬁnition of political power for this model in section 2. In section 3 we state the main
result. We conclude in section 4.
2. BARGAINING MODEL
Consider a set of n ≥ 2 players N = {1,...,n}. They convene in periods t =1 ,2,...to divide
a ﬁxed divisible good. Thus, possible agreements are denoted by a vector x =(x1,...,x n) drawn
from a set ∆n ≡ {x ∈ Rn :
Pn
i=1 xi =1 ,x i ≥ 0},t h e(n − 1)-dimensional unit simplex in Rn.
An agreement requires the approval of a winning coalition, C ⊆ N. The set of winning
coalitions is determined by the underlying voting rule and is represented by a subset, D,o ft h es e t
of all possible subsets of N, i.e. D ⊆ 2N. We assume that D is non-empty and monotonic,s ot h a t
10E.g. Gul, 1989, Hart and MasCollel, 1996, discuss non-cooperative implementation of the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) on which the Shapley Shubik power index is founded. Shapley and
Dubey, 1979, oﬀer an axiomatic foundation for the Banzhaf index.
11The literature in this area — with implicit or explicit reference to proposal assignment — is vast.
We mention Shepsle, 1979, Shepsle and Weingast, 1981, Denzau and McKay, 1983, Shepsle and
Weingast, 1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987, Weingast and Marshal, 1988, McKelvey and Riezman,
1992, Dion and Huber, 1996, Schickler and Rich, 1997, Cox, 2001, etc.
5for any two coalitions A, B with A ⊆ B ⊆ N,w eh a v eA ∈ D =⇒ B ∈ D. Monotonicity requires
that coalitions that encompass winning coalitions are also winning coalitions.12
Subsumed in this framework are familiar quota rules, as well as the weighted majority voting
rules analyzed by Snyder, Ting and Ansolabehere, 2001. Also covered are the voting rules consid-
ered by Winter, 1996, McCarty, 2000a,b, as well as the two versions of bicameralism analyzed by
Diermeier and Myerson, 1999, and Kalandrakis, 2004.13 Still, these studies represent only a small
fraction of the possibilities permitted by our assumptions on the voting rule D.
For any admissible voting rule, the interaction of players proceeds as follows. In each period
t =1 ,2,..., prior to reaching an agreement, one of the players is recognized with probability πi
to make a proposal z ∈ ∆n. Having observed the proposal, players vote yes or no. If a winning
coalition vote yes, then the game ends with z being implemented, else the game moves to the next
period. Naturally, the vector of probabilities of recognition, π, is such that π ∈ ∆n.
Each player i ∈ N derives von Neuman-Morgenstern stage utility ui (x)=xi.P l a y e r s
discount the future by a factor δi ∈ [0,1], i ∈ N.T h u s , t h e p a y o ﬀ of i ∈ N from a decision
x ∈ ∆n r e a c h e di np e r i o dt ≥ 1 is given by δt−1
i xi. In the event of perpetual disagreement players
receive zero. We denote a game with voting rule D,d i s c o u n tf a c t o r sδ ∈ [0,1]
n, and recognition
probabilities π ∈ ∆n,b yΓ(N,D,δ,π).
A stationary proposal strategy for player i ∈ N in game Γ(N,D,δ,π) is a division of the
good, zi ∈ ∆n,p r o p o s e db yp l a y e ri when i is recognized. A stationary voting strategy is a set
Ai ⊆ ∆n that contains the divisions of the dollar on which player i votes yes. With stationary voting







12In eﬀect our assumptions allow the entire class of simple games (Dubey and Shapley, 1979, page
101), and are as general as in Banks and Duggan, 2000, with regard to the voting rule.
13Diermeier and Merlo anlayze a situation in which a separate allocation of the resource is made
to each of the members of the two houses, while the division of the resource is, eﬀectively, among
regions (big and small) with diﬀerent voting weights in the two houses in Kalandrakis. A related
model of bicameralism studied by Ansolabere, Snyder, and Ting, 2003, cannot be represented in
our framework because of their assumption that the allocation of the resource is among players
(districts) in the lower house, while players in the upper house (states) have preferences that only
depend on the size of the median allocation among districts within their state.




i∈N involve no-delay if zi ∈ A for each i ∈ N.
Given stationary strategies for all players, the continuation value of i ∈ N, denoted by vi,i s
deﬁned as the expected utility of i if the game moves in the next period. A no-delay, pure strategy





i∈N and a corresponding vector of continuation values v ∈ ∆n, such that for all
i ∈ N,w eh a v evi =
P
h∈N πhzh
i , x ∈ Ai ⇐⇒ xi ≥ δivi,a n dzi ∈ argmax{xi : x ∈ A}.
In what follows we will refer to such an equilibrium simply as a pure strategy SSP equilibrium,
omitting the no-delay property. Note that we require that players vote yes i fa n do n l yi ft h e yp r e f e r
the proposed agreement to their discounted continuation value, δivi. This rules out implausible
SSP equilibria in which players vote in arbitrary ways on proposed agreements due to the fact they
are not pivotal. Baron and Kalai, 1993, refer to these voting strategies as stage undominated.
We call equilibrium continuation value vi the political power of player i in game Γ(N,D,δ,π),
since it corresponds to that player’s ex ante expected fraction of the good. For clarity, we restate
this as a formal deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 v ∈ ∆n is a political power vector for players 1,...,n in game Γ(N,D,δ,π) if it
represents players’ continuation values in a SSP Nash equilibrium.
Note that we do not rule out the existence of multiple political power vectors for the same
game, although uniqueness does obtain in the case of simple majority rule (Eraslan, 2002). The set
of possible levels of political power, v =(v1,...,v n), in game Γ(N,D,δ,π) is the set of all possible
divisions of the good, ∆n. In the next section we shall show that for every voting rule D,a n d
any discount factors δ ∈ [0,1]
n, every possible political power v ∈ ∆n can be obtained in game
Γ(N,D,δ,π) by appropriate choice of recognition probabilities π ∈ ∆n.
3. INDETERMINACY OF POWER
We start this section with a pair of examples in which we illustrate how prespeciﬁed levels
of power can be obtained by appropriate choice of recognition probabilities. These examples pave
the way for the main result of our analysis which we state toward the end of this section.
7We ﬁrst consider a four-player committee with a veto player:
Example 1 (Committee with outside Veto) Assume n =4and δi = 1
2 for all i ∈ N.P l a y e r
4 has veto rights and a majority of the remaining players must also approve proposals. Thus
D = {{4,1,2},{4,1,3},{4,2,3},N}.


































for the respective players. In particular, all proposals obtain the vote of the veto player 4 and a





i , i =1 ,...,4,a n d
P4









5 t h e s ee q u a t i o n sa r es a t i s ﬁed. Thus, the proposals form an SSP equilibrium and v∗
represents players’ political power in the associated game.
Note that the veto player receives a payoﬀ that is exactly equal to that of the remaining
players. In eﬀect, this requires that the veto player has a smaller probability of making proposals.
Next, consider a dictatorial voting rule:
Example 2 (Dictatorial Rule) Assume n =3 , δ1 = 3
4,a n dδ2 = δ3 = 1
4. Let player 1 be the
dictator so that
D = {{1},{1,2},{1,3},N}

















constitute optimal proposals since players 2 and 3 must obtain
the consent of the dictatorial voter, while player 1 can dictate the outcome when proposing. We




i , i =1 ,2,3,a n d
P3







In the above example we have ‘stacked the deck’ in favor of player 1. Not only does player
1h a v ed i c t a t o r i a lv o t i n gp o w e r ,b u ts h ei sa l s om o r ep a t i e n t ( δ1 >δ 2 = δ3) than the other two
players. As a result, her bargaining power is higher, all else equal. But when all else is not equal, in
8particular when players 2 and 3 have signiﬁcantly higher proposal-making probability, their political
power can be larger than that of the dictatorial voter.
We could proceed to derive similar outcomes for other voting rules, or sustain alternative
equilibrium values in the above cases. We trust that these examples provide a stark illustration of
our argument. With appropriate choice of proposal rights, even players that have no voting rights
(i.e. dummy players that are superﬂuous in every winning coalition) such as players 2 and 3 in the
last example, can have more power than a dictatorial voter.
In both examples we considered, we ﬁxed the voting rule, D, discount factors, δ ∈ [0,1]
n,a n d
‘target’ political power, v∗ ∈ ∆n, and sought n recognition probabilities, πi, i ∈ N,f o rt h ep l a y e r s
that satisfy a set of n +1linear equations. These probabilities must also satisfy n inequalities,
πi ≥ 0, i ∈ N. By adopting a formulation introduced by John Nash, 1951, we show that a solution
to these equalities and inequalities exists for every admissible D, δ,a n dv∗. Speciﬁcally:
Proposition 1 Consider any non-empty, monotonic voting rule, D, and any discount factors δ ∈
[0,1]
n. For every v∗ ∈ ∆n there exists a set of recognition probabilities π∗ ∈ ∆n such that v∗ is the
political power of game Γ(N,D,δ,π∗) in a SSP Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. See the appendix.
It is important to emphasize what proposition 1 does not state. First, it does not imply
voting rights are irrelevant. All else constant, the voting rule does aﬀect players’ expected payoﬀ.
Similarly, the typical conclusion in sequential bargaining games regarding the eﬀect of discounting
is not threatened by proposition 1. What proposition 1 does make plain is that proposal power
‘trumps’ these other aspects of the environment that determine players’ power.
The converse is not true in general, as we will now show (by example) for the case of voting
rules, discount factors, and history dependent strategies that satisfy sequential rationality. First,
consider a game with N = {1,2}, πi = 1
2, and discount factors δi = δ<1, i =1 , 2.F o r t h i s
game it is not possible to devise a voting rule that will sustain equilibrium value v∗ =( 1 ,0). Next,
for the same example under unanimity rule (D ={N}), there is a unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, i.e. even if we allow equilibria in which players use complex strategies, there is a





. Finally, it is easy to see that in a simple majority rule game
9with N = {1,2,3} and π1 =1 , there is no choice of discount factors for the three players that
sustains equilibrium value v∗ =( 0 ,x,1 − x), x ∈ [0,1].
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that in standard bargaining models over a ﬁxed divisible resource, the voting
rule, impatience, or the use of simple strategies do not jointly restrict political power if we can
manipulate proposal rights. This result quantiﬁes the relative signiﬁcance of proposal-making in
inﬂuencing political power in comparison to voting rights. It also highlights the importance of pro-
posal rights as an institutional dimension with which to inﬂuence political outcomes. We spend the
next few paragraphs in an attempt to anticipate objections that can be leveled to these conclusions.
One objection to the signiﬁcance of our result for the purposes of institutional design is that
proposal prerogatives either cannot be manipulated via rules or that they empirically correlate with
voting rights. We do not dispute proposal and voting rights correlate in many existing committee
conﬁgurations. In theoretical studies such a correlation stems from the natural benchmark assump-
tion to treat individual committee members symmetrically. But despite the empirical or theoretical
relevance of restrictions on the assignment of proposal rights, the fact remains that proposal rights
and voting rights can vary independently.
Importantly, constitutions can be written to determine proposal rules in arbitrary ways. In
the EU, for example, small and big countries rotate with equal frequency in the presidency of the
Council of ministers, even though the voting rule is weighted according to population. David Primo,
2002, discusses formal institutions operating under majority rule that stipulate a unique proposer,
i.e. assign all proposal power to a single individual.
We can ﬁnd similar examples when considering informal committee environments. In certain
cultures, senior members are seldom interrupted when expressing opinion and, hence, enjoy privi-
leged access to proposal-making in council or committee meetings. Similarly, readers familiar with
tumultuous student deliberations in amphitheaters will recognize that proposal power is markedly
higher for the subset of participants that belong in the intersection of loud and eloquent speakers.
Even in otherwise delineated democratic polities such as the U.S., campaign ﬁnance practices
10imply signiﬁcantly reduced political power for the poorer segments of society that otherwise have
equal voting rights. This is because access to a developed media industry via monetary contributions
is essential for a viable electoral campaign and subsequently for the formulation of proposals. In
short, individual heterogeneity can and often does induce a divergence between de facto or de jure
proposal rights and voting rights.
A related objection has to do with the probabilistic nature of proposal prerogatives in our
model. In particular, probabilistic recognition generates an inﬁnite set of proposal making insti-
tutions to select from, while the choice of voting rules is eﬀectively among a determinate number
in ﬁnite committees. We deem probabilistic recognition a reasonable assumption in the absence
of explicit rules that determine the identity of the proposer. The fundamental insight from the
literature on proposal rights (and from our study) is that proposing in such settings is desirable.
As a result it seems natural that the resolution of agent’s competition for access to proposal-making
takes place randomly when no other rule or individual resolves this indeterminacy.
Empirically, probabilistic recognition seems to better ﬁt the data for the selection of forma-
teurs during government formation negotiations in multi-party parliamentary systems compared to
a deterministic process according to the size of the parties’ parliamentary representation (Diermeier
and Merlo, 2004). But, empirical relevance aside, the question of whether probabilistic recognition
is a natural assumption is not relevant from the point of view of institutional design. There are
no technological constraints that would prevent the author(s) of committee rules or constitutions
to stipulate the determination of the proposer via some randomization device such as the one
we model. In other words, probabilistic recognition is a feasible institutional choice (even if the
resultant distribution of political power is not acceptable or politically viable).
Lastly, readers may object to the idea that committee interaction follows the rules speciﬁed
in our model versus some other more elaborate sequence of proposal-making and voting on the part
of committee members. Certainly real world constitutions and parliamentary rules of procedure
are more complicated than what we assume. The restricted set of institutions for proposal-making
we consider renders our result even stronger. In particular, if we can choose from a richer class of
rules and procedures for the origination of proposals compared to the one we allow, we can achieve
11more equilibrium power levels than those permitted under the maintained assumptions.
Admittedly, the complex parliamentary rules we encounter in real legislatures exist in part
in order to accommodate informational or other organizational needs (e.g. gains from exchange)
emanating from the policy space. These considerations are not relevant in the policy space we
study. Another important reason for the complexity of legislative rules is direct evidence in favor
of our conclusion: self-organizing legislatures adopt elaborate rules to safeguard against the abuse
of proposal prerogatives exactly because proposal making can have such a signiﬁcant impact on
outcomes.
12APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1


















h ≤ 1 for all v∗ ∈ ∆n, we can construct a proposal zi ∈ ∆n
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δjv∗




h if j = i
0 otherwise
.
If players use proposal strategies zi∗ ∈ ∆n, i ∈ N and recognition probabilities are given




i ,i ∈ N. To prove the proposition, it suﬃces to ﬁnd π∗ ∈ ∆n such that





i∈N,w h e r eA∗
i = {x ∈ ∆n : xi ≥ δiv∗
i } form a
SSP equilibrium with political power v∗ ∈ ∆n.
To ﬁnd such a π∗, we construct a continuous function Π : ∆n −→ ∆n, that maps the space
of recognition probabilities into itself. We deﬁne
Πi (π) ≡




, i ∈ N
where the continuous function φi : ∆n −→ R+,i sg i v e nb yφi (π) ≡ max{0,v∗
i − vi (π)}.N o wΠ
maps the convex, compact ∆n into itself, hence it has a ﬁxed point Π(π∗)=π∗,b yB r o u w e r ’ s
theorem. Furthermore, it is obvious that π∗ = Π(π∗) i fa n do n l yi fφi (π∗)=0for all i ∈ N.T h u s ,
for the ﬁxed point π∗ we must have v(π∗)=v∗, and the proof is complete.¥
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